

International

## **TERRORISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

NIGE:

In May 2013, the government declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in response to attacks by Islamist group Boko Haram. The announcement came after a spate of fighting which led to over 200 deaths, extensive property damage and a prison break. Increased security operations since May have reduced the group's capability to carry out mass-casualty attacks in cities in the south, in particular Lagos. But Boko Haram is likely to continue to stage attacks in other

hreat Watch

northern states (their area of operations) – which includes Kano and Kaduna but primarily centres around Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states – against security and civilian targets (mainly Christian and Southern communities or those seen to be collaborating with security forces). Attacks on Christian targets are likely to lead to retaliatory action against Muslims, particularly as security forces increase their reliance on vigilante groups.

Internationalist members of BH and its



splinter group Ansaru, which the British and French governments have stated is aligned with AQIM, have increased the likelihood of attacks against Western targets, particularly in northern Nigeria. In February 2013, BH took seven French hostages, abducted in Cameroon, to hideouts in northern Nigeria (released in April 2013), while Ansaru kidnapped seven foreign construction workers from Bauchi. Both groups explicitly linked the abductions to the French military intervention in Mali. Expatriates in the northwest and north-central states face increasing risk of kidnap and ransom by these factions, especially in response to perceived Western action against Islamic interests.

Violent risks from Niger Delta militants, namely the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), were substantially reduced with the 2009 amnesty programme. Security forces have reduced the inflow of illegal weapons, but MEND and its splinter factions are still well armed. The government's failure to include all ex-militants in the third phase of the amnesty, and the imprisonment of MEND leader Henry Okah in South Africa, have increased the risk of targeted attacks on oil and South African operations in the Delta from moderate to high. The amnesty programme is scheduled to end in 2015, at which point the risk of attacks will increase.

Weapons seized from Boko Haram militants

The risks of IED attacks on mining facilities and the kidnap and targeted killing of expatriates have reduced from "High" to "Elevated" in the south, particularly Bamako, due to the presence of foreign troops. Such risks would increase in the event of a collapse of the ceasefire between the government and Tuaregs, however. Further, jihadis are likely to re-launch a guerrilla campaign from bases in border areas with Niger, Algeria and Mauritania. Kidnap risks around Gao, Timbuktu, and the Taoudénit basin where Algerian firm Sonatrach and the Canadian firm Selier Energy operate are therefore likely to remain high in the three-year outlook. Foreign hostages in jihadi custody (of which there are currently about eight) are more likely to be used to seek political concessions than for ransom, and to be executed if jihadi demands are not met. Additionally, there is a high risk that jihadi sympathisers in the north and Bamako will seek to co-operate with Islamist militants in the event of a resumption of civil war. This would pose a high risk of targeted attacks against government, military and Western assets and personnel in the south. French targets would be most at risk, but any Western targets would be exposed to opportunistic attacks.



## DRC/RWANDA/UG


The M23 is likely to be defeated by the FARDC, and remaining M23 rebels are likely to flee across the Rwandan and Ugandan borders. The security risk in North Kivu is only likely to be significantly reduced in the event that the FARDC and FIB also engage the FDLR and ADF rebel groups, however, which is unlikely in the six-month outlook. Therefore, the risk of hit-and-run cross-border gun and grenade attacks is likely to be high over the next six months, particularly in Virunga. Although the primary targets are likely to be the FARDC and MONUSCO forces, rebels are also likely to stage attacks on commercial assets in the region to secure new revenue flows. Fighting between the M23 and other rebel groups and militia forces is also likely to pose high collateral risk of injury and damage in the eastern region at least in the two-year outlook.

In the event of a Rwandan (and Ugandan) military incursion, ground cargo along the N2 road and aviation at Goma airport will be seriously disrupted for several weeks or months. Minerals purchasers, especially of gold, diamonds, and coltan (colombitetantalite), will face increased reputational risk through US Dodd-Frank legislation that imposes a certification scheme on minerals derived from the central African region. Rwanda is likely to use its UN Security Council seat to attempt to prevent UN condemnation of its actions or to impose economic or targeted sanctions.

The main threat is from Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab and its sympathisers, due to Kenyan participation in the AMISOM mission in Somalia. The group claimed responsibility for the gun and grenade attack on Westgate mall, Westlands, Nairobi on 21 September 2013. Al-Shabaab has repeatedly threatened to launch large-scale attacks in Nairobi and was previously blamed for an explosion at a shopping complex on Moi Avenue in May 2012, which injured over 30 people.

Large international hotels, Western diplomatic assets and US businesses in Nairobi and Mombasa are at particular risk, most likely from al-Shabaab-sympathiser suicide bombs (either vehicle-borne or on foot), remotecontrolled IEDs, shootings and grenade attacks. Public places such as markets, transport hubs, churches, restaurants and shopping malls are also targets, especially if foreigners or Christians congregate there.

Muslim youths are becoming increasingly radicalised in coastal Kenya, making small-scale attacks on soft targets in Mombasa, including bars, nightclubs and resorts very likely. In June 2012, three people were killed and 25 wounded in a bar in Mishomoroni, Mombasa during a multiple grenade attack which is likely to have been staged by MYC, al-Shabaab's Kenyan offshoot. Hotels in Mombasa and Indian Ocean coastal resorts are vulnerable to al-Shabaab attacks, and those accessible by boat are at risk of Somali pirate kidnap attempts. Hotel security is unlikely to prevent an attack. Additionally, supporters of the secessionist group the Mombasa Republican Council are likely to attack government and security assets. In March 2013, a day before the elections, a 200-strong group of alleged MRC supporters ambushed police in Mombasa and killed at least six police officers and six civilians.



Kenyan troops attempt to enter the besieged Westgate shopping centre