Last updated: 14/09/2011 | 23:24 |  

Israerli Special Forces in action(Getty Images)

As Israeli Special Forces continue to counter both Islamic and Jewish extremist threats, Tamir Eshel explores the many fronts of their CT efforts and the role industry is playing to help meet those threats

Engaged in constant conflict with its Arab neighbours, the Jewish state has faced terror and insurgency threats long before the state of Israel won its independence. Although organisations’ names, identities and causes changed through the years, many hostile Arab groups remain today as they were a decade ago – determined to destroy Israel. Against this constant peril, Israel’s security organisations stood up dedicated special operations units to pre-empt, interdict and disrupt these threats. 

In the mid-1970s, well-funded Palestinian terrorist organisations led the growth of international terrorism, launching “mega attacks” on schoolhouses, kindergartens, hotels and busses, as well as aircraft hijackings and bombing, and by attacking civilian and military targets along the coastal areas, through infiltration from the sea. The attack on the Israeli team at the Olympic games in Munich in 1972 marked the highlight of this murderous assault, inevitably lead to a global retaliation campaign and bolstering the country’s coastal lines and transportation routes.

Palestinian terror constantly evolved, improving their planning and professional execution, challenging Israel’s security forces to adapt, learn and respond with innovative counter-terror techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP). As part of this change, special operation elements were established within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), police, Internal Security Agency (ISA) and intelligence organisations (such as Mossad). Specialising in specific techniques, including sophisticated aviation security, urban assault, maritime counter-terrorist operations or transportation security, became a top priority. Teams were also designated specific areas of operations (AOR) like the West Bank, Gaza Strip, South Lebanon or even foreign lands abroad, where terrorist threats were abundantly suspected.

By the mid 1980s, following the 1982 Lebanon war, the Palestinian insurgency gained enough popular support to enable it to operate safely from population centres in the West Bank and Gaza; it therefore turned to the abduction of soldiers along the porous Lebanese border. Later, in the occupied territories, abduction of soldiers became a common mode of terrorist operation. For Israel, negotiating the freedom of their soldiers against the release of convicted prisoners became a most sensitive military and political dilemma. Spurred on by the successful 1976 Entebbe raid, where the IDF forcefully liberated a hijacked Air France passenger plane flown to Uganda, Israel was determined from then on to act offensively and unflinchingly – to not to negotiate with the terrorists. But tactical failures of such operations caused decision makers serious second thoughts, and led many politicians to opt for negotiation.

Despite the lack of determination at the top level, the military was always eager to get the “green light” to act. Technical labs operating with the units, the military R&D centre and specialised industries were challenged with requests for solutions ranging from sensors – enabling teams to see through walls – to means of enabling rapid cold or hot breaching into enclosed spaces, with maximum speed and surprise.

Following the withdrawal from parts of the West Bank in the late 1990s, Israel's counter terror situation has worsened and became more complicated, as part of the areas once dominated by its military and intelligence forces turned into the terrorist “safe havens” and operational jump-off locations, exploiting the lack of a strong authority actively controlling the area. While some of the organisations – namely the PLO in the West Bank – largely turned away from violence, maintaining a virtually peaceful conduct, former affiliates refused to accept this trend and vowed to become Israel’s worst enemies, fuelled by extreme religious movements. These include the Hamas movement now controlling the Gaza strip, which gaining foreign state support from Lebanese Hezbolla, Iran, Syria or new extremist Palestinian factions affiliated to al-Qaeda and international Jihad.

The unilateral evacuation of South Lebanon in 2000 and the Gaza Strip in 2005 has negatively affected Israel’s ability to gain human intelligence in these areas, necessitating a shift to the collection of intelligence by technological means. In the Gaza strip, where an open conflict is raging between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas, Israel has embarked on a policy of retribution, hunting the leaders and those directly responsible for attacks either immediately, when located and identified as targets, or long after their actions. Attacks have often been carried out from the air, involving lightweight precision guided weapons developed to allow forces to quickly respond to tactical opportunities while risking minimal collateral damage. These operations often require reliable real-time intelligence support to identify, track and designate “short-lived” and fleeting targets and to pinpoint them in those short moments in which they are exposed to such high-precision attacks.

Remotely operated sensors and weapons have gained much support among Israel’s top brass, who realise that aerial sensors carried by unmanned aerial vehicles can provide persistent surveillance and control of large areas, coupled with rapid situational understanding and decision-making. They have yielded effective results in eliminating terror elements or intercepting terrorist teams, often even before they carry out their attacks. In fact, through the early 2000s Israel’s military developed a whole new strategy, highlighting the role of aerial dominance, to which the Palestinians and Lebanese Hezbollah responded with a counter-surveillance strategy of disappearance, concealment and avoidance. To provide a complete situational understanding, the Israelis realised they needed three-dimensional views of the scene, compiled from aerial images provided by unmanned aerial vehicles, complemented by ground observation provided by persistent unattended ground sensors (UGS), positioned in the area and operated for weeks, months and even years, transmitting images covertly to Israel’s command centres. Hezbollah uncovered one such sensor in 2010, believed to have remained in position since the mid 1990s. Sensor technology has evolved in recent years, including the Israeli UGS specialist Seraphim which has introduced two new generations of UGS, among them the MUGI, and Chameleon, optimised for Urban Covert Video Surveillance.
Both air dominance and concealment concepts were tested for the first time during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, where Israel’s special operations forces were inserted into south-west Lebanon, hunting Hezbollah rocket launching teams. Equipped with advanced target acquisition systems, special teams were able to locate enemy activity and call in precision guided weapons such as the Tamuz electro-optically guided missile, before enemy rockets were actually launched, thus eliminating some of the threats. They could not, however, completely prevent these massive attacks.

Effective camouflage for the warfighters, and their equipment is of paramount importance for such covert missions, a challenge taken up by Israel’s camouflage specialist Fibrotex. The company developed a method to print optimised camouflage patterns on different types of material, including man-size Ghillie suits utilised by special operations teams or snipers. 
But the enemy’s “disappearance” strategy has also proved highly effective, with operatives diving into underground hideouts constructed under the dense foliage, or in underground bunkers constructed under village houses, preventing Israeli aerial or ground surveillance.
Two years later, following the Second Lebanon War, both sides had another chance to test their operational concepts, this time in Gaza, during operation “Lead Cast”. Here, in the densely populated Gaza strip, Israel maintained air dominance, forcing the Palestinians into conducting many of their activities under the plastic covers of agricultural greenhouses, in tunnels dug through the soft sand or in subterranean mazes dug under villages and urban areas.

Subterranean warfare has become a major challenge for the Israeli forces. Operational techniques evolved from extremely dangerous human surveillance of potential enemy locations, to the use of remotely controlled and robotic sensors, some specially designed with 360-degree vision, lighting, thermal imaging and indoor-optimised communications. One such system is the EyeDrive miniature robot, developed by ODF. This four-wheeled robot can be dropped down on a concrete floor from a height of two floors, or lowered down into a well or cellar. Equipped with its integral 360-degree vision system, it can potentially pack a small explosive charge to engage hostiles upon detection. Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is also developing a unique counter-IED system, comprising a miniature launcher packing 16 pyrophoric rockets each capable of disabling an explosive device from a distance of few of meters.

In the West Bank, where Israel and the Palestinian Authority maintain a fragile coexistence, a limited Israeli presence is maintained in Palestinian-controlled areas. As this area continues to simmer with new terror threats, Israeli Special Forces have shifted to “low signature” operations, employing special combat teams trained to blend into the local population, gain intelligence or launch surgical actions, mainly in the apprehension of suspects or elimination of “ticking bombs”.

Covert operations are not directed exclusively at Palestinians. Israel’s police and ISA has also formed specialised undercover units operating inside Israel, due to a growing unrest among extremist Jewish communities, since the mid 1990s, culminating with the assassination of Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin in 1995 which brought the ISA to focus greater attention on these sectors.

One of the most challenging phenomena that came into effect since the early 2000s is the ability of hostile groups to motivate individual action. In the past, insurgency required physical infiltration of key operatives into the area of operation, in recruiting supporters, setting up logistical support bases, communications infrastructure intelligence-gathering, planning and execution. These long processes were prone to interception. Today, much of these recruitment, indoctrination, training and support are conducted on the Internet, enjoying the anonymity of the global network. But as the terrorists shifted to operating online, so too did the fight against terrorism. Today’s special operations units take advantage of cyber warfare tools to monitor cellular phones and other communications, as well as gather information from open sources and plot social links between suspects, weeding hostiles from non-combatants.

Tamir Eshel is a professional writer and consultant specialising in the field of defence technology. With over 30 years of experience, his work has been published in professional publications worldwide, including National Defense, US Navy Proceedings, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Military Technology, Vayu, Asia Pacific Defense Reporter, Technologia Militar, Naval Forces, and Defense-Update.