Last updated: 13 Nov 12 @ 03:23  |  

Yellow card: dosimeters are an effective way to manage population triage after a nuclear incident

Marke Harari discusses the complacency surrounding preparations for radiological incidents, and warns that governments could face Fukushima-style panic and chaos if their dosimetry technology and response plans are inadequate

On 11 March 2011, my train arrived in Peutie – a small suburban town in the outskirts of Brussels – where I was met by a uniformed officer. Peutie hosts the regiment in charge of Belgium’s radiation and nuclear issues. The officer in command had granted me an interview on the recommendation of an ex-colleague met in Abu Dhabi during the IDEX 2011 exhibition. This ex-colleague is now working with an international organisation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNe) first responders in charge of cleaning-up hazardous zones where war has left traces of contamination.

This was my first direct contact with army headquarters in Europe, and my mission was to present a friendly, low-cost, simple, instant reading alert dosimeter – the SIRAD. SIRAD is a sort of indestructible credit card with an integrated chemical sensor, based on diacetylenes, that reacts by color change when exposed to ionizing radiation.

The meeting was friendly – as friendly as a meeting between a civilian and career military can be. After a couple of hours of presenting our product to a team of interested officers, and answering some technical questions, the colonel in command told me: “Thirty years ago, your product might have been of some interest, but nowadays – now that the cold war is over – there are no such risks or nuclear issues to worry about. Besides, we have all that is required. Let me show you our dosimetry service”.

In a small room, two soldiers who care for the entire national military dosimetry department, proudly showed me the few hundred neatly stacked dosimeters. They are in charge of reading and reporting the measured doses and reporting them in the books, and they also make sure the batteries are changed regularly.

“You only have a few hundred dosimeters for the whole country? What about the civilians? Do you not have families, wives, children, and mothers? What happens if there is an accident in one of your power plants? It could even happen in one of your neighboring countries. Do you not remember Chernobyl?” I asked, a little surprised.

“There are no such risks!” answered the very confident soldier in charge. “Besides, your maintenance-free solution would only cause me to lose my job!”

So, after a nice meal at the officers’ canteen, I was driven back to the train station with a very low spirit and mitigated feelings on the success of my endeavor and the issue of distribution of SIRADs to authorities in charge of public safety.

And then… it happened. While waiting for my train, the news broke out on the TV screens all over the Brussels train station: a giant tsunami had struck the town of Fukushima, destroying the city and inundating the Daichi nuclear power plant causing the almost immediate meltdown of two reactors. One month before, in Abu Dhabi, we had definitely felt out of place amid all the sophisticated military equipment, with every passing officer telling us that they had all the necessary paraphernalia required for monitoring their radiation exposure. One month later, on 15 March at GSA in Singapore, the attitude was different; the improbable accident had happened and concern was evident. We were one of the most visited booths on the show and several press correspondents told us we probably had the most innovative, appropriate and important product exhibited.

When I returned to Europe, a week later, I decided it was necessary to contact national authorities in charge of disaster management and nuclear issues. So far, countries that rely on nuclear power supplies have not responded as we would have expected, however: they say there is no tsunami risk in our areas, their technology is much safer, and that transparency on the subject is not deemed necessary. Communication on the subject also appears incompatible with military issues. The industry of professional dosimetry is very profitable as it is, and a cheaper solution such as the one offered by SIRAD is not too welcome on the market.

So we are now addressing the populations living in the vicinity of nuclear power plants through independent civilian institutions such as local information commissions (CLIs) who are in charge of local emergency management in France, the National Agency for Co-ordination of CLIs (ANCCLI) and so on to EUROCLI and the EC.

Our accomplishments have not been very successful, so far, but with NGO activists flying over nuclear plants and clearly showing how weak the protection is against sabotage or terrorist attacks, we may achieve better results in the near future. The risk of terrorist attack is the highest ranking now since 9/11 and clearly the main preoccupation of our CBRN defense and security services. After Fukushima, surveys of our NPP installations clearly highlight the general underestimation of potential risk and ensuing disaster management. Panic is the major factor of casualties in such an event, and this is precisely why a simple device such as the one we would like to promote was funded by US government grants.

The subject is not simple, however. How can NPP operators explain to populations that such a risk exists and accordingly communicate on preventive and reactive measures without causing fear? What exactly is a dangerous level of exposure? What is the difference between a radiation source measurement and accumulated dose? Cumulated dose exposure have reached levels of 500mSv and above in the area of Fukushima, twice as much as the allowed lifetime exposure for nuclear workers.

Since the first day of the Fukushima disaster, we have been present in Japan together with experts and politicians, evaluating the best way to provide our personal instant reading alert dosimetry solution to the exposed populations. It has taken more than a year for the Japanese government to recover from the shock and to begin structuring reconstruction and communication on nuclear issues. New ministries had to be created to that purpose and to regain trust and confidence from the civilian population. Over that period it became clear that individual dosimetry was required, not only for first responders but also for the concerned population.

Our dosimetry solution has finally been accepted as the only efficient and affordable solution to manage triage of the affected population. A plan is being put in place for the distribution of our products to all families living in the vicinity of nuclear power plants. Last month, in New Jersey, we finally managed to organise a two-day presentation to a Japanese ministerial delegation at the manufacturing site of SIRADs in the presence of a representative of CTTSO/TSWG that funded their development, together with representatives of major dosimetry suppliers.

We sincerely hope that this very important move from the Japanese authorities, due to take place over the next 20 or 30 years, will trigger decisions at all other governmental levels worldwide, to consider putting in pace preventive measures before such an accident could occur. There are plans for the evacuation of the population and the distribution of KI pills, but these procedures rely on an estimation of potential radiation release over the following month. KI pills should only be absorbed at cumulated exposure levels above 100mSv; absorption below this level can cause damage to the thyroid. But how does one know if he has personally been exposed to such a level without individual dosimetry?

What would the required lowest level of detection be? This LLD varies from one country to another, and harmonisation would definitely be required. Officially, a civilian should not be exposed to more than 1mSv/year above background radiation (between 2 and 4mSv/year depending on the area). Therefore an LLD of 5 or 10mSv would be apparently required in order to prevent unnecessary concern or panic, yet some countries would set the LLD at 50mSv. The fact is that, below 250mSv, there are no medically traceable effects of radiation, but worried populations – such as is the case today in Japan – would want readings at levels of micro sieverts (0.001mSv) in food and water.

Are we talking of hourly, monthly or yearly exposures? All this science needs to be explained in simple words to concerned populations. Information and transparency are required urgently. Let us hope our governments have the courage to face the issue before it happens. After, it will be too late. The problem should now be addressed on a global level as Chernobyl should have taught us; national or private interests are inappropriate when the future of life on earth is at stake.

Marke Harari is a designer engaged in research and development, engineering and international marketing consultancy. He is also a partner of XTSafety, a distributor of SIRAD dosimeters manufactured by JPLabs.